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This paper reports on a project that explores how terrorist attack sites become 
communicative platforms within which three kinds of enactment- the terrorist 
attack, counter measures by the state and affective public responses- construct 
narratives and counter narratives about terrorism. This approach is applied in 
research project that explores the range of meanings that emerge around the site 
of the 2002 Bali Bombings in Kuta, the political nature of commemoration and 
the ways in which victims voices become part of the narrative/counter narrative 
of violent extremism. The conceptual framework applied in this research 
incorporates performance theory and notions of the audience (government and 
publics) as narrators in a discourse of contested meanings that are also enacted 
through the symbolic imagery of the attack site. The findings reported here 
demonstrate how attack sites become dynamic spaces for the interpretation and 
reinterpretation of meanings about terrorism embodied in the narratives 
generated by the performance roles of various actors. These meanings challenge 
the performative power of the terrorist attacks but also construct counter 
narratives to official responses to terrorism.  
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Introduction 
The Monday October 14 edition of the Jakarta Post’s Bali Daily featured a front page 
article in which Bali Deputy Governor Ketut Sudikerta addressed the congregation at 
the commemoration of the 11th Anniversary of the 2002 Bali bombings held in the 
Memorial Garden at the Australian Consulate-General office in Denpasar. “This 
commemoration will raise our awareness of similar potential dangers.” He stated, 
“We learned from the tragedy that we should prioritize our security system" (Erviani 
2013). The politicisation of the commemorations as a reminder of the ongoing threat 
to security may not align well with the narrative of commemoration and 
remembrance, but it draws attention to the inextricable link between terrorism, 
counter-terrorism by the State (in all its manifestations) and public responses 
performed through rituals of memorialisation. This paper presents a conceptual 
framework that applies notions of performance and performativity to examine how 
terrorist attack sites become communicative platforms within which three kinds of 
enactment- the terrorist attack, counter measures by the state and affective public 
responses- construct narratives and counter narratives about terrorism. As such, this 
paper relies on conceptualisations of terrorism as choreographed performance directed 
not at the actual victims but at a broader audience of spectators, witnesses and victim 
populations.  It also argues for the importance of studying terrorist attack sites as 




theatres of performance that carry symbolic meaning both as the targets of destruction 
and as spaces for the constant reinterpretation of individual and collective perceptions 
of terrorism. This approach is applied in a three year research project, now in its 
second year, that follows attempts by the Australian based Bali Peace Park 
Association Inc. to acquire the land of the site of the former Sari Club where 88 
Australians perished in the dual bomb attacks in Kuta in 2002i. The project explores 
the range of meanings- often contested- that emerge around the attack site and the 
ways in which victims voices become part of the narrative/counter narrative of violent 
extremism. Terrorist attack sites are often recognised for their symbolic significance 
through which the terrorist attack generates its performative power. The conceptual 
framework presented in this paper calls for an application of performance theory that 
incorporates notions of the audience (government and publics) as narrators in a 
discourse of contested meanings that are also enacted  through the symbolic imagery 
of the attack site.  
Performance has been used as an organising concept in the social science 
disciplines to understand how individual and collective actions communicate 
constructs of self, experience and world views. Turner describes performance as 
social or cultural drama that encompasses several levels of cultural behaviour from 
everyday communicative acts to public ritual and theatre. Performance and 
performativity have also been applied to analyses of terrorism and counter terrorism, 
most notably as concepts for understanding the communicative functions of terrorism 
and counter terrorism for both the terrorists themselves and the audiences they seek to 
mobilise or affect.  
Much of the scholarly contribution to performance and terrorism has come from 
outside the academic disciplines traditionally associated with terrorism studies. These 
contributions emerge out of interests in symbolic communication, the discursive 
construction of terrorism, witnessing terror, collective responses to terrorism and its 
affects.  Within this space, notions of performance and performativity offer a way to 
move beyond the construction of acts of terror as ahistorical and disconnected from 
the social realities of everyday lives. Adler(2010) attempts to redefine the strategy of 
conflict by focussing attention on social power: individual and collective capacity to 
construct social reality. For Adler the symbolic significance and the capacity to 
control the ways in which this significance is perceived are central for the 
performative power of terrorism: “when actors project particular cultural meanings to 
public audiences in pursuit of instrumental goals or common understandings, they are 
engaged in contests about narratives, norms of appropriate behaviour, the legitimacy 
of goals and demands, and the definition of cooperation versus defection and of 
victory versus defeat” (p. 204). 
Understanding terrorism through the framework of performance and performativity 
necessarily shifts attention away from strategic or material goals of terrorism, 
definitions, root causes and individual mindsets that have dominated the field of 
terrorism studies and focusses instead on the ways in which terrorist acts attempt to 
indirectly influence strategy by making a symbolic statement. Terrorism is about 
perception. For this very reason, it is the way the act is perceived and constructed- the 
meanings that are given to the act- that are all important. The performative power of 
terrorism relies on the capacity of the act to generate constructions of meaning that 
align with or prefer the terrorists’ intended meanings and, indirectly, achieve the 
terrorists’ strategic goals. These meanings are also part of the performance and are 
enacted through the counter measures adopted by the state and the affective responses 
adopted by the public. In this sense, performance also draws necessary attention to the 
audience- those members of publics who receive, perceive and make sense of 
meanings.   
The performative power of terrorism 
The performance of terrorism expresses, through violence, an image of the world that 
terrorists want to communicate to an audience: it enacts imagery. At the same time it 
is also a reflective, inner enactment or performance that is experienced, though not 
necessarily expressed to the public. In this sense, terrorism is both outwardly and 
inwardly performative. It communicates an imagining of the world to a public (often 
an international audience) and an experience of the world to the terrorist himself or 
herself. It is not just the outward expression of imagery- by projecting to an audience 
an imagery of the world that the terrorists want us to see- but also the inward 
experience of imagery from which terrorism derives its performative power. By 
enacting terrorism, the terrorist actor is not communicating with one audience, but 
rather several audiences some of which are identifiable and corporeal: the immediate 
victim, the resonant mass, the government, the collective mass (Aly 2009) and some 
of which are intangible and ethereal: the self and the deity.  
Performances elicit valuations and evaluations of images that are vested in 
experience and emotion. Both performers and their audiences bring to the 
performance the affective accumulation of experiences and understandings through 
which the performance is understood and analysed. Previous and socially constructed 
experiences of emotions prescribe how a performance will be symbolically 
constructed. For example, the ideal model of romantic love prescribes that love is 
experienced through physical acts that signify affection. Feelings of anger on the 
other hand are implied by physical acts of aggression (Palmer and Jankowiak, 1996). 
Performative acts of violence do not elicit evaluations of images that imply love or 
attraction; they are imagined and symbolically constructed as acts of hatred, revenge 
and anger.  Acts of terrorism are therefore limited in what they can symbolically 
communicate to an audience through the performance of violence. Altheide (2004) 
notes that media coverage of the September 11 attacks demonstrated “simply the 
enemy’s dislike of the United States of America, its freedom and lifestyle. Indeed, 
anyone who suggested that the “cause” of the attacks was more complex and that the 
United States had angered many political groups by previous actions (e.g., support for 
Israel) was denounced” (p. 291).  
The experiencing of imagery in performance limits the extent to which 
performative violence can symbolically communicate anything other than hatred, rage 
or anger. Terrorism therefore has a diminished capacity to control the ways in which 
the symbolic significance of the act is perceived: its performative power. The kinds of 
responses the act elicits are also limited by the accumulation of affects to the point 
that such responses become almost reflexive- even automated. Aly and Balnaves 
(2005) argue that public responses to terrorism are modulated by the political and 
media discourses that perpetuate public anxiety and elicit an affective response to fear 
embodied in the reinforcement and renewal of collective identity. Harindranath 
(2011) concurs, stating that the political battles over mediated images of terrorism 
affect public feelings of insecurity which are enacted through expressions of concern 
and suspicion about threatening ‘others’. 
Terrorism conveys meaning by enacting images that are symbolically represented 
by tangible objects- buildings, trains and buses, schools, military bases- or people- 
soldiers, politicians, diplomats, civilians. The performative power of terrorism is 
derived when terrorists evoke imagery in their audiences that is interpreted by 




audiences in the same way- that is when the symbolism and the interpretation are 
understood by both the terrorist and the public in ways that correspond. The symbolic 
significance of terrorism is vested in its capacity to appeal to vast collectives of 
people who have little knowledge of each other but who share in the spectacle of the 
event. Whether terrorists succeed in evoking interpretations in the minds of audiences 
that correspond to their symbolic meaning depends largely on the social and cultural 
contexts in which meaning is constructed and symbols become representative. 
Interpretations of terrorist acts are rarely unmediated and always transpire in context. 
Audiences of terrorism are not a monolithic collection of spectators, but interpret 
terrorism through cultural discourses, lived experiences and as members of social 
networks. A school may be a symbol of the lack of educational opportunity for the 
groups that terrorists claim to represent; but for the audiences that are agents in the 
interpretation of the terrorist performance, the school may be symbolically 
representative of innocence. Thus the imagery of the performance (in the mind of the 
performer/ terrorist) is not connected to the imagery of the interpretation (in the mind 
of the interpreter/audience). Importantly, the imagery of the interpretation may, and 
often is, highly reliant on media and official discourses that modulate how audiences 
construct meaning from a terrorist act.  
Studies on the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of communication 
consistently find that terrorism is a flawed communication strategy. Cordes (1978) for 
example argues that terrorists are poor communicators because their message lacks 
clarity. In order to be effective as a form of communication, terrorism relies on 
attention from the mass media. Violent acts of mass destruction are devised to attract 
significant media coverage to disseminate the intended message, yet they more often 
elicit media coverage that is counter- productive to the terrorist goal of publicising 
their cause. Media coverage of terrorist campaigns tend to ignore terrorist goals 
altogether, instead focussing on the destructive impacts of the act. Media coverage of 
the September 11 attacks focussed primarily on the rescue efforts, the victims, their 
families and on establishing the dominant themes through which the response to the 
attacks would be communicated and understood.   An examination of studies on 
coverage of the September 11 attacks and the ensuing ‘war on terror’ in the United 
States media reveals some common themes: good versus evil; the evil ‘other’ is 
Islamic terrorism; Osama bin Laden personifies this evil; the West must battle evil 
and protect freedom and democracy (Erjavec & Volcic,2007). Overwhelmingly these 
studies concur that the discourse of patriotism and collective identity was deployed to 
mobilise support for the official response to the attacks and to stifle any pluralist 
discussion on the possible motivations or cause for the attacks.  
In Australia, the 2002 Bali Bombings were similarly constructed as an attack on 
freedom and liberty. In the media and official discourse on the Bali bombings, the 
attacks were framed as a direct attack on Australia and Australian values. The media 
and political discourse on the attacks drew on socially shared stereotypes of 
Australian values: larrikinism, laid back attitudes and a love of partying. The attacks 
were therefore interpreted as an enactment of hatred of these values (Aly 2010).  
Much of the analysis of modern terrorism tends to construct the performative power 
of terrorism through its relationship with mass media. These analyses examine how 
terrorist attacks are orchestrated as media events – events that occur independently of 
the media but whose significance and scale are generated by the media (Dayan and 
Katz 1994; Weimann and Winn 1994), or how media coverage of terrorism influences 
public opinion and generates fear (Altheide 2004; Massumi 2005).  
Jenkins (1974) describes terrorism as drama primarily directed at achieving 
international attention in order to inspire fear. Writing at a time when terrorism first 
took to the international stage with airline hijackings and hostage takings, Jenkins 
noted the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the mass media, through 
which terrorists were able to reach a broader audience by staging dramatic attacks. 
Through the conceptual lens of symbolic communication Jenkins drew attention to the 
terrorists’ audience stating that “The hostages themselves often mean nothing to the 
terrorists. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not the actual victims. Terrorism 
is theatre”(p.4). Karber (1971) also noted that terrorists target their messages at 
recipients other than the immediate victims. Writing specifically on hostage taking 
incidents, Price (1977) considers both the immediate victims and spectators or 
witnesses as targets of terrorist messages. He proposed three categories of audiences 
to a hostage taking incident: the immediate victim (the hostage); the identification 
group (those responsible for the welfare of the hostage); and the resonant mass (the 
broader victim population).  Two decades later, Weimann and Winn (1994) engaged 
Jenkin’s notion of terrorism as theatre and applied it to an analysis that deconstructed 
media oriented terrorism as a form of symbolic communication enacted through 
violence.  
The 2001 September 11 attacks on the United States reignited interest in the 
symbolic dimensions of terrorism as performance with several analyses drawing on 
the significance of the Twin Towers as symbols of American capitalism. Weimann 
(2008) draws particular attention to the ways in which production requirements are 
adopted in the orchestration of terrorism stating “Terrorists pay attention to script 
preparation, cast selection, sets, props, role-playing, and minute-by-minute stage 
management. Just like compelling stage plays or ballet performances, the media 
orientation in terrorism requires full attention to detail to be effective.” (p. 71).  
Bharucha (2014) argues that terrorism itself is not a performance, but that its 
performativity lies in the responses to terrorism that give it meaning: spectatorship, 
witnessing, engaging with media representations of spectacle and critical responses to 
the media and discourses that evolve around the event.  “The performance of terror, I 
would emphasise, is built through the accretion of these responses, and not through 
the act of terror itself” (p.27). Several other scholars have explored responses to 
terrorism through concepts of performance in order to emphasis agency and draw 
attention to the ways in which diverse actors adopt performance roles, construct and 
contest narratives about terrorism (Howie, 2013). 
As Weimann (2008) notes, however terrorism and terror have always had a 
performative aspect, even before the advent of the mass media. Weimann cites the 
example of the French Revolution where public executions by the guillotine were 
used to spread fear. Earlier waves of terrorism such as the public assassinations of 
symbolic figures carried out by the Sicarii in the first century AD and the martyr 
operations of the Ismaili- Nizaris centuries later were orchestrated campaigns of 
violence that inspired both widespread fear and admiration without the media (Aly 
2011). David Rapoport (1984) observes that the Ismaili- Nizaris (or Assassins as they 
are also known) “did not need mass media to reach interested audiences, because their 
prominent victims were murdered in venerated sites and royal courts, usually on holy 
days when many witnesses would be present.”  
Writing on the performative history of terrorism, Kubiak (1991) makes the point 
that notions of terrorism and theatre are not limited to analyses of what is often 
described as the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media. According 
to Kubiak such analyses assume that it is the relationship between terrorism and the 
media that gives terrorism its performativity. Alternatively, Kubiak argues for a 




conception of terrorism as “a natural extension of performative terror”(p.25), 
describing it as “an extreme, theatricalised violence” and cautions that “when terror’s 
roots and causes are represented in the formation of performance/media/theatre 
events, and the connections between the socialising, disciplining power of terroristic 
violence are cut-off from the ontologic terror which generates them- when terror loses 
itself in the Imaginary- we lose sight of terrorism’s mechanisms and are denied the 
possibilities of resistance” (p.20).  
Kubiak’s assertion to look beyond the media representation in the analyses of 
performance and terrorism offers an opportunity to refocus attention on the responses 
to terrorism as opposed to the construction of terrorism as the locus of performativity. 
Notwithstanding the role of the media in influencing the ways in which terrorism is 
constructed and the ways in which witnessing and spectatorship are performed, there 
is more that can be said about the performative roles of diverse actors in constructing 
narratives (and counter narratives) about terrorism. That is to say, while 
acknowledging the communicative role of the media in terrorism, the ways in which 
victims and governments respond to acts of terrorism also have performative power. 
The performative power of counter terrorism responses, both through official 
channels and through civil society, is located in narratives that evolve around not just 
the media discourses of the event but also around the act itself.  
The audience as performer: counter terrorism as 
performance 
Performance and performativity offer an opportunity to examine the audiences that 
terrorism performs to and the performative acts that construct counter narratives to 
terrorism.  Audience reception theory recognises that the messages embedded in a text 
(whether written or visual) are polysemic and interpreted differently by different 
audiences in different contexts. Importantly, reception theory (and the field of 
audience reception studies that it spawned) recognises that audiences are not latent 
receivers of messages but active agents in the construction of meaning (Hall, 1980).  
A significant contribution of audience reception theory is its ability to engage 
audience research with diverse fields of interest including the study of audiences as 
civic or political actors. Reception theory has also been applied to spectators of 
performative events, for example theatre audiences. In terms of terrorism, the concept 
of audience as actors in the reception (and production) of performance has 
predominantly focussed on how audiences construct media generated images of 
terrorism (see for example Aly, 2010).  A consideration of reception theory in the 
analysis of performative acts of violence starts from acknowledging that terrorists are 
driven by the primary objective of influencing multiple audiences and that these 
audiences, individually and collectively, have agency in constructing narratives and 
counter narratives to terrorism. The convergence of performance theory extends this 
even further to a conceptual repertoire that examines how audiences contest the 
imagery of terrorism through performative acts. These performative acts include 
several levels ranging from the everyday and banal to public and private rituals of 
commemoration enacted on attack sites of symbolic significance. Attacks sites 
become theatres wherein terrorism and counter terrorism are performed through the 
enactment, expression and experience of imagery by a range of actors who construct 
and reconstruct meanings about terrorism and its responses; where these meanings 
may converge or diverge and where new meanings can be constructed, reconstructed 
and negotiated. 
Terrorists perform with an audience or audiences in mind but can never really know 
the audience(s) upon whom they project their imagery. There is also no guarantee that 
the imagery they project corresponds with the imagery the audience perceives. The 
“contention over the imagery of an event depends on interpretive frameworks, and 
these may vacillate between several cultural and psychological domains, such as legal 
process, theatre, and personal responsibility” (Palmer & Jankowiak, 1996, p. 245). 
Audience members may also adopt performance roles and become performers in 
order to contest the performance imagery of terrorism. Performance roles that contest 
imagery are as much an enactment of imagery through symbolic expression and 
experience as the performance they challenge.   When audiences perform acts that 
contest the imagery of terrorism they become narrators in the discourse- creating 
counter narratives that challenge the legitimacy, morality, truth, and appropriateness 
of the terrorist narrative.  The contention over the imagery of terrorism is performed 
by two audience groups in related but distinct ways. One group is the governments 
who, through state driven counter measures, enact imagery about the meaning of 
terrorism that serve a national agenda.  The other is the public who participate in 
symbolic acts that challenge the imagery of terrorism.  
Just as terrorism derives its performative power in how it is perceived, so to counter 
terrorism (meaning here the vast array of responses to terrorism from official 
discourses to military action) is a performative act in so much as it also attempts, both 
directly and indirectly, to make a difference in how people perceive the world and, 
more specifically, in how people perceive the act of terrorism itself. By constructing 
the act of terrorism in a certain way over another, counter terrorism attempts to 
deconstruct and/or re-construct how terrorism is perceived in ways that serve an 
official or national agenda. What counter terrorism is- military action, social 
harmony, surveillance, security, foreign aid - is also what terrorism is- act of war, 
disruption, insecurity, social and economic inequality. Terrorism and counter 
terrorism are narrative and counter narrative, counter narrative and narrative- both 
contribute to the scripting of the performance.  
De Graaf (2011) emphasises the importance of conceptualising counter terrorism as 
communicating a narrative. Describing counter terrorism as performativity, she states: 
The way in which policymakers perform, or in other words carry out the process 
of countering terrorism, can have more impact than the actual arrests being 
made (or not being made). This is the so-called performativity of counter-
terrorism or its performative power. Performativity in this context indicates the 
extent to which a national government, by means of its official counter 
terrorism policy and corresponding discourse (in statements, enactments, 
measures and ministerial remarks), is successful in selling its representation of 
events and its set of solutions to the problem, as well as being able to set the 
tone for the overall discourse regarding terrorism and counterterrorism – 
thereby mobilising (different) audiences for its purposes. (p.3) 
De Graaf’s analysis limits performativity to official discourses, strategies and actions 
of state driven counter terrorism. Conceptualising counter terrorism programs as 
performative acts that have the potential to create and sustain convincing counter 
narratives provides an opportunity to develop counter narratives that disrupt the 
emergence of terrorism supportive moral contexts and prevent exposure to these 
settings. However, community based and citizen driven responses are also part of the 
performativity of counter terrorism and a comprehensive account of the performative 
power of counter terrorism should also take these into account. At the official level, 




counter terrorism is constructed and enacted in the interests of national security and 
international diplomacy. At the grass roots, community level, audiences become 
performers through acts that construct and communicate an imagery of terrorism that 
challenge the performance imagery of terrorism and, often, of state driven counter 
terrorism.  
Public performances that contest the imagery of terrorism are enacted through a 
range of specific and symbolic acts. One example is the ‘Paddle for Peace’ ceremony 
held in Kuta beach Bali. The event, staged on the anniversary of the 2002 Bali 
bombings, sees hundreds of foreign and local surfers paddle out to sea and form a 
giant circle to perform prayers and offerings. ‘Paddle for Peace’ enacts the imagery of 
peace through shared understandings and experiences of peace- joining of hands, 
prayers, offerings. It communicates an imagining of terrorism as a threat to peace and 
peacefulness. The performative act of peace is constructed and enacted in contestation 
to the performative act of violence. Other kinds of rituals of remembrance and 
commemoration are also performative acts that are part of the terrorism/counter 
terrorism performance. How terrorism is remembered is not disjointed from how 
terrorism/ counter terrorism is imagined and perceived. While remembrance and 
collective memory have rarely been studied as part of the broader field of terrorism 
studies, how people choose to, are required to, or even demand to, remember acts of 
terrorism are part of the performativity of terrorism and counter terrorism. Contested 
meanings around terrorism/counter terrorism are played out on the sites of attacks that 
become platforms for much more than attempts to construct how the act is 
remembered and the victims memorialised. These sites become theatres for a battle of 
meanings about what terrorism is and conversely, what counter terrorism could be. 
Attack sites as theatres of performance 
The choice of attack site is central for communicating the symbolic significance of the 
terrorist act. As stated earlier, sometimes the symbolic significance is specific. When 
animal liberation groups firebomb an animal testing laboratory for example, the 
performative power of the act is heightened because the symbolic significance of the 
attack site is specific and the symbolic construction of the performance implies 
emotions of hatred or anger. The imagery projected by the act might communicate 
something like ‘we are angry at the use of animals for experimentation’. When 
terrorist groups attack sites with a social or cultural function, such as a nightclub, or 
infrastructure, such as public transport, the symbolic significance of the attack site is 
ambiguous but the symbolic construction of the performance implies the same 
emotions of hatred or anger.  The performative power of terrorism is weakened 
because the imagery projected by the act communicates hatred or anger for no 
obvious, rational or specific reason other than ‘because they hate us’. 
Mark Juergensmeyer (2003) refers to terrorist acts as both performative events- in 
the sense that they are symbolic; and performative acts- in the sense that they 
represent attempts to change something. The violent act of terrorism is not just about 
creating a spectacle- in particular international acts of terrorism performed on a world 
stage- but it is also perpetrated in the hope that the terrorists might indirectly or 
strategically make a difference in how their audiences perceive the world. For 
Juergensmeyer the performative power of terrorism is its symbolic significance, often 
communicated through the choice of attack site. In some cases such as the bombings 
of abortions clinics, the symbolic significance of the attack site is specific. In other 
examples, the sites symbolise the power and stability of the society being attacked 
and the destabilising capacity of terrorism: “Such central places- even if they exist 
only in cyberspace- are symbols of power, and acts of terrorism claim them in a 
symbolic way. That is, they express for a moment the power of terrorist groups to 
control central locations- by damaging, terrorizing, and assaulting them-even when in 
fact most of the time they do not control them at all” (p. 134). While the site of the 
attack most often holds symbolic significance for both the terrorists and the societies 
in which these sites have a cultural or social function, the act of terrorism itself can 
also be more than symbolic “by demonstrating the vulnerability of the governmental 
power, to some degree it weakens that power. Because power is largely a matter of 
perception, symbolic statements can lead to real results” (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 
135). 
The symbolic significance of attack sites extends beyond their capacity to 
communicate something on behalf of the terrorists who assail and destroy them. 
Attack sites also hold symbolic significance for the governments, victims and the 
collectives that terrorist seek to influence and who also have something to 
communicate about the terrorist act itself.  While attack sites are most commonly 
studied or analysed for their symbolic significance or tactical importance to the 
terrorists and prior to an attack, contested meanings interact, challenge and resolve in 
the narratives and counter narratives that are created around attack sites and their 
symbolic significance after the attack. Sturken (2007) has examined the ways in 
which New York’s Ground Zero has become a focal site for the generation of 
narratives and counter narratives about terrorism and its impacts produced through 
practices of memory and mourning. She argues that the narratives and meanings 
constructed around Ground Zero reveal a complex amalgamation of local and national 
agendas. The narratives produced at Ground Zero are constructed around the localised 
social, economic and cultural functions of the site both before and after its 
destruction. At the national level these narratives matter “when they are deployed in 
the service of national agendas, within a broader global context in which images of 
the United States are exported with political consequences” (p. 168).  
Within the anthropological domain, attack sites have primarily been studied as sites 
of remembrance and ritual commemoration. But these practices are also part of the 
performativity of terrorism and, to reiterate Sturken’s (2007) point, also matter vis a 
vis the narratives and counter narratives they embody about terrorism and counter 
terrorism. Performance theory- the enactment and experience of imagery (Palmer and 
Jankowiak 1996)- offers a framework for understanding how audiences of terrorism, 
including the terrorists themselves, adopt performance roles and how attack sites 
become communicative platforms for the production of narratives and counter 
narratives about terrorism. 
In 2003 the Bali bombings memorial was constructed at a busy intersection situated 
in between the former Paddy’s Bar and Sari Club. The memorial is in the form of a 
monument fashioned in traditional Balinese architectural style. The monument bears 
the names of the 202 victims of the bombings listed according to country and in no 
particular order. The inscriptions are entirely in the local language and pay tribute to 
those who lost their lives.  
The 2002 Bali bombings had a severe economic impact on the island that had for 
decades relied on its reputation for harmony and tolerance to attract international 
tourists. The monument represents an attempt by the Indonesian and provincial 
Balinese governments to seek a pragmatic response to the Bali bombings enacted 
through motifs of economic recovery and the return of tourism. This response 
symbolised an imaging of the bombings as an attempt to dislodge the ‘Bali Harmony 
discourse’ within which “notions of hegemony, dispute, or discontent are treated as 




aberrations, indeed risks, for the restoration of a sustainable progress. The social and 
cultural agonisms inevitably generated by Bali’s modernisation, increasing 
cosmopolitanism, and engagement with a globalising economy are played down.” 
(Lewis & Lewis 2008, p. 196). 
The Bali monument creates an “authorized homology” that privileges a particular 
imagery of the terrorist event and imposes a homogenous memory and narrative. The 
homology produced by the monument “conceptualized the atrocity in terms of an 
official ideology and memory that would (re)synthesize the disparate parts of 
Indonesia that had succumbed to the force of global-local contentions and political 
violence” (Lewis et al, 2013, p.23). The authorized narrative of harmony and 
unification endorsed the national government’s agenda for security building as well as 
the local Balinese interests for economic recovery. Lewis et al (2013) have previously 
reported on a research project that examined the mechanisms that propagate counter 
narratives to the monument. Their research explored how visitors to the monument 
destabilize its homology through the ways in which they engaged with the monument 
and its surrounding space- taking holiday photographs, using the space as a meeting 
point and rejecting the monument’s “claim to universal value and reverence” (p. 31). 
The remaining sections of this paper present a study on the Bali Peace Park, an 
attempt to build a commemorative park on the site of the 2002 Bali Bombings in 
Kuta. The case holds specific interest for exploring how performative acts of 
commemoration communicate different imaginings of terrorism that challenge official 
discourses of counter terrorism.  
The Bali Peace Park Research Project 
The Bali Peace Park is an initiative of the Australian based Bali Peace Park 
Association Incorporated (BPPAI). The BPPAI was established by victims and 
survivors of the two Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005. It seeks to establish a park on 
the site of former Sari Club where 202 people (including 88 Australians) died in the 
2002 Bali bombings. The initiative was conceived sometime around the second 
anniversary of the Bali bombings when a group of Australian tourists discovered that 
the Sari Club site could be purchased. The Bali Peace Park Association has since been 
working towards achieving the goal of acquiring the land in order to build its vision of 
the Bali Peace Park. For at least eight years, the Association has been embroiled in a 
legal and political battle over the site. The 800 square metre tract of land in one of 
Bali’s most lucrative tourist districts is owned by a wealthy businessman unwilling to 
part with the block. Plans to develop the block into another nightclub site mobilised a 
movement to halt all re-building on the site. The Balinese government responded by 
issuing an embargo preventing any development of the site. Both Australian and local 
Balinese authorities have staked a position on the proposed Bali Peace Park. The park 
has bipartisan support from the Australian government and the local support of the 
Balinese Governor and community leaders. 
The first of the Bali bombings was a suicide bomb at Paddy’s Bar. The explosion 
wreaked havoc and forced the patrons, dazed, confused and injured to flow out onto 
the street and into the nearby Sari Club. Minutes later, a second much more powerful 
vehicle borne explosive device ripped through the Sari Club and its surrounds. The 
site of the former Paddy’s Bar has since been rebuilt into a multi-storey night club. 
More than 11 years on from the Bali bombings, the Sari Club site stands abandoned. 
For many years it was neglected, overgrown with weeds and bordered by a damaged 
fence. In recent years it has served as a makeshift car park for the many cars and 
motorbikes unable to park on Kuta’s hectic streets. To the unaware, the site is 
anonymous- its only relevance is as Kuta’s singular car park amid a sea of concrete 
and glass, constant traffic, loud music and raucous tourists making their way from one 
bar to the next. In fact the Sari Club site is the locus of an ongoing battle for meaning 
about the Bali bombings and their response. 
A three year project funded by the Australian Research Council uses qualitative 
methods, including individual interviews and surveys to explore how individuals and 
communities engage with the proposed Bali Peace Park as a communicative platform 
for collectively resisting the social, cultural and economic impacts of terrorism 
through the enactment of contested imagery. Peace parks are defined as 
transboundary protected areas‖ (Lejano, 2006) dedicated to conservation and the 
promotion of peace and cooperation between nations. They include themes of conflict 
resolution and cooperation between actors‘, which can be nations, communities, 
agencies and other stakeholders, as well as individuals. Traditionally, peace parks 
were conceptualised as vehicles of conflict resolution and peace keeping between 
parties. Lejano (2006) distinguishes between two models of peace parks. The first 
model, conceptualised through game theory, revolves around conflict as space 
allocation and situates the peace park as a conflict free, neutral zone. This model 
emphasises the material functions of the peace park as a kind of buffer zone between 
parties in a territorial or ethnic dispute. The second model theorises peace parks as 
structures of care through which peace parks function as a bridge to cooperative 
activity. This model emphasises the social and cultural functions of the park as a 
medium for cooperative engagement that promotes peace through mutual 
understandings of self and identity. The primary function of the park is not derived 
from its physical site of no conflict but as a mechanism for relationship building. For 
the parties involved the park functions as a symbol and setting for newly-constructed 
collective identities that drive and define future activities. The Bali Peace Park offers 
a third model: park as counter-narrative. This model constructs the park as a 
communicative practice which develops collective narratives of resistance to 
terrorism and forms the basis for the research project.  
The purpose of the project is to explore the ways in which the attack site is a locus 
for the performance and reception of the terrorist attack by examining the narratives 
and counter narratives that are enacted at the site. To examine the ways in which 
narratives have been generated by the Sari Club site and the proposed Bali Peace 
Park, the first phase of the research reported here employed a combination of methods 
including interviews, surveys and participant observation. The interviews were carried 
out with members of the Bali Peace Park Association, Australian and Balinese 
survivors of the 2002 Bali bombings and local Balinese supporters and detractors of 
the Peace Park. The surveys were conducted with visitors to the monument and Sari 
Club site in the days leading up to the 11th anniversary of the Bali bombings in 
October 2013. Participant observations provided further insights into the practices that 
are performed in and around the Sari Club site.   
Contested imaginings and the performance of narrative on the Sari Club site 
The research findings elucidate the various imaginings of the 2002 Bali bombings 
that continue to be enacted, expressed and experienced through the site of the Sari 
Club site where the opposing arguments to rebuild or remember signify a battle of 
meanings about the symbolic significance of the attacks. These meanings are 
embodied in the narratives generated by the performance roles of various actors- the 
Peace Park Association, survivors and victims of the bombings, visitors to the 
memorial sites, the local Balinese population-  that challenge the performative power 




of the terrorist attacks as well as that of the official responses to the attacks in three 
ways.  Firstly, unofficial enactments of memory on the Sari Club site challenge the 
authorised Balinese response inscribed through official acts of memorialisation. These 
performative acts also challenge the perceived imagery of the terrorist attacks by 
constructing a counter narrative that personalises the victims through remembrance. 
Finally, the peace park represents an attempt to reinscribe the Australian official 
response to the Bali bombings that imagined the attacks as an assault on Western 
liberal values.  The performance of narrative on the Sari Club site is not static and 
signifies the reinterpretation of individual and collective perceptions of the 2002 
attacks.   
Challenging the official response through the performance of memory 
For victims (including family members) and survivors of the 2002 bombings, the 
Sari Club site is sacred land. At the site of the attacks families of victims and 
survivors defy the boundaries of authorised performativity inscribed in the official 
Bali monument and conduct their own form of ceremony within the site that now 
serves as a makeshift car park. In the days leading up to the anniversary, Australian 
flags and tributes begin to line the boundary fence of the Sari Club site, while the 
memorial remains untouched. It is not until the day of the anniversary that families of 
the victims engage in the authorised commemorative performance by placing their 
tributes at the memorial. For them, the site of the attack is more symbolically 
significant than the monument that stands just a few short steps away. On the day of 
the Anniversary, family members gather within the boundary fence of the former Sari 
Club site to light 88 candles- each representing an Australian victim of the bombings. 
The ritual has been performed every year since the first anniversary. Those who 
cannot make it to Bali, await the photographs confirming that their loved one too has 
been remembered on this day. When asked why they commemorate at the Sari Club 
and not the memorial, one family member responds: “That’s where it happened. 
That’s where she died. Not the memorial”.  
The unofficial shrines and performances on the Sari Club site directly challenge the 
authorised homology of the monument which attempts to relocate the symbolic 
significance of the attacks and prescribe how and where performative acts of 
collective memory are performed. The monument invites a kind of passive 
engagement- one that is demarcated by its form and that is constantly challenged by 
the performers, be they locals using the monument as a meeting place or victim 
groups who persist in marking the symbolic significance of the Sari Club site. 
In conducting unofficial performances of commemoration on the Sari Club site, 
victim groups construct a re-imagining of the Bali bombings vis a vis the symbolic 
significance of the attack site. Victims groups adopt performance roles that contest 
and challenge the authorised imaginings of the Bali bombings at one level and contest 
the imagery of terrorism enacted in the bombings at another level. The private and 
public performances of commemoration resituate and redefine the significance of the 
Sari Club site as the theatre of performance. They also redefine the social, economic 
and cultural functions of the site in much the same way as the practices of memory 
and mourning on 911’s Ground Zero did (Sturken 2007).  
Re-imagining the Bali bombings through the performance of memory 
Even in its stagnation, the Sari Club site is not a static receptacle but a space where 
contested narratives are constantly constructed and reconstructed. The debate over 
whether to rebuild or memorialise on the Sari Club site represents a clash between 
two expressions of response: resistance versus remembrance. Do we resist terrorism 
by rebuilding (bigger and better) what was there before, thereby sending a message to 
terrorists that ‘we will not be influenced by violence’? If the Sari Club site remains 
unbuilt therefore preventing the development of another nightclub or tourist night 
spot, is this not the transformation that the terrorists were hoping to achieve? Or do 
we remember the atrocity of terrorism by commemorating those innocent people who 
lost their lives, thereby sending a message that ‘we will never forget’? These two 
forms are not entirely autonomous. They are inextricably linked to how terrorism is 
perceived as an indirect, strategic attempt to change something about how we view 
the world. 
The research has found that to Australian and international visitors to the site, 
remembrance is the overwhelmingly preferred option. This should not be surprising 
considering that remembrance is attached to Western notions of cultural preservation. 
In the context of the Sari Club site and the existing Bali monument, the argument to 
incorporate a stable cultural form of memorial on the Sari Club site is more complex. 
In its current state as an empty lot, the Sari Club site does not prescribe a narrative 
about the attacks. That it exists as anything other than a car park is in the collective 
memory of those who were immediately impacted by the event. The majority of 
visitors to the monument are unaware of the significance of the empty site as the 
primary locale of the Bali bombings. Once they become aware, their responses are 
most markedly ones of emotional attachment: shock, disappointment and surprise.  
The unofficial enactments of memory on the Sari Club site also challenge the 
perceived imagery of the terrorist attack by constructing a counter narrative that 
personalises the victims. Writing on the spontaneous shrines that emerged in and 
around the site of Ground Zero, Sturken (2007) argues that the individual practices of 
remembrance form a counter narrative to the spectacle of collective disaster created 
by the 9/11 attacks. The attacks were primarily designed to create a spectacle of 
imagery that became inscribed in the now familiar image of the collapsing towers. 
Such imagery, argues Sturken (2007), projects mass destruction and collective loss: 
de-individualising the victims and burying their identities in the mass of dust and 
rubble that blanketed the city: “Whereas the images of spectacle produced an image 
of collective loss, of a “mass body”, these rituals sought to speak of the dead as 
individuals. As such, these objects and messages attempted to resist the 
transformation of the individual identities of the victims into a collective subjectivity, 
and thus to resist the mass subjectivity of disaster” (Sturken, 2007, p. 178). 
Santino (2006) observes that spontaneous shrines are in fact political in nature: a 
form of social commentary on issues of social or political significance: gun violence, 
AIDS, roadside deaths, domestic violence and terrorism. The acts of commemoration 
that are performed on the site of the Sari Club in Bali construct a counter narrative to 
terrorism by humanising the victims of terrorism and drawing attention to the 
devastation caused by violence. Santino describes this dynamic in the following 
paragraph:  
It is said that in war a combatant is trained to depersonalize the enemy, to 
demonize the enemy in order to be able to kill that enemy with little or no 
remorse. Spontaneous shrines act in the opposite way. They perform the 
opposite task. They insist on the personal nature of the individuals involved in 
these issues and the ramifications of the actions of those addressed by the 
shrines... You are carrying out a holy war? You killed my father. Paramilitaries 
are killing people in the name of freedom? The IRA killed my wife. That’s not a 




Taig or Prod- that’s my husband; my father; my brother. You are conducting 
wars against terrorism? You killed my mother; my sister; my daughter. Now. 
Defend your actions, your politics, in the light of that.  (p. 13) 
The communicative power of spontaneous or unofficial shrines and commemorations 
such as those on the site of the Sari Club is derived from performativity. By 
performing acts of private commemoration on the actual attack site of the Bali 
Bombings, the unofficial commemorations turn the attack site into the theatre of 
performance. They meet the terrorists on their own ground and communicate their 
resistance through rituals that humanise the victims. At the same time, they also resist 
the official discourse of commemoration: ‘This is where she died. She is not just a 
name on a plaque. She was my sister, my mother, my friend, and she was killed here.’ 
Through the performativity of memorialisation, remembrance becomes resistance: 
unofficial performances of memory do not just memorialise the victims of attacks; 
they enact an imagery that contests the imaginings of the terrorist attack and challenge 
its performative power.    
Challenging the Australian discourse on the Bali bombings through the 
performance of memory 
In the aftermath of international terrorist incidents in the US, Bali, Madrid and 
London, responses often suggested that a return to normality was a demonstration of 
resistance to terrorism. This kind of response mirrors the Western political rhetoric 
which constructs counterterrorism as a defence of democratic values and ―our way 
of life, and translates collective resistance as the upholding of liberal democratic 
values. Consequently, during the 2000s, counter-narratives to terrorism were 
constructed as narratives that espoused the values of liberal democracy and rejected 
ideological influences that criticised the West. 
The choice of Paddy’s Bar and the Sari Club as the attack site for the 2002 Bali 
bombings was perceived to be a symbolic statement of the terrorists’ opposition to 
Western values enacted through the targeted destruction of the site. A manuscript 
written by the Jemaah Islamiya ideologue, Ali Ghufron ( aka Mukhlas), who received 
the death sentence for his part in organising the Bali bombing justifies the bombing as 
a religious and moral defence for the US led war in Afghanistan. The manuscript 
under emphasises the notion that Paddy’s Bar and the Sari Club were targeted because 
they were places of immorality. Yet the attacks were constructed as a protest against 
Western decadence and Australian values of freedom and liberty in the Australian 
media and political discourse and in the affective public responses to the attacks in 
Australia. Other attacks by JI on Australian interests in Indonesia include the bombing 
of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004. In contrast, the political and media 
construction of the embassy bombing did not emphasise the attack as an assault on 
Australian values. The point of difference between the ways in which these two acts 
of terrorism were contextualised is focussed on the attack site. Prior to its destruction, 
the Sari Club was well known among locals and visitors alike for its exclusivity. 
While tourists enjoyed free entry to the Club, locals and visiting Indonesians were 
charged an entry fee in a deliberate attempt by the Club’s owner to brand the Club as 
exclusively Western. The choice of the Sari Club as an attack site enacted an imagery 
of terrorism that was interpreted as anger over what the Sari Club symbolised: 
Western decadence and the pollution of Indonesian moral values.    
For Australians, the affective public response to the bombings was enacted through 
motifs of national pride that symbolised an imagining of the bombings as an attempt 
to destroy the very foundations of the modern nation state (see Lewis 2006). The first 
commemoration of the bombings in 2003 was used by the Australian government as a 
platform to garner national support for its involvement in the ‘war on terror’: 
“Australia was able to “imagine” the memorial space [of the 2002 Bali bombings] as 
a site of reverence and remembrance, a place in which the holy force of the war on 
terror could be articulated as a transnational, ideological, and even cosmological 
mission” (Lewis et al, 2013, p.32). 
As previously mentioned peace parks are traditionally defined as trans-boundary 
buffer zones between parties in a conflict.  As such, the proposed Bali Peace Park is 
not so much a peace park as it is a park for peace. The concept of the Bali Peace Park 
has necessarily evolved to negotiate both Balinese and Australian responses to the 
attacks in order to garner necessary political and local support for its construction. 
Local reception of the proposed park among the Balinese is fragmented in much the 
same way as it was to the Bali Bombings Monument. Contentions over the meaning 
of the site for the Balinese are embroiled in local traditions of culture that inscribe 
certain ways of dealing with cycles of life and death. The body of work by Lewis and 
his colleagues (2006, 2008, 2013) elucidates the disparity between local community, 
national and transnational narratives that were enacted in the aftermath of the Bali 
bombings. For the local Balinese, the Western notion of commemoration is at odds 
with the traditional Hindu concepts of history and memory enacted through cleansing 
and interfaith rituals to restore the delicate cosmological balance between good and 
evil (see Lewis 2006, Lewis & Lewis 2008, Lewis et al 2013). 
While the Bali Peace Park Association has been cautious not to describe the 
proposed park as a memorial, media reports invariably describe it as a memorial park 
to honour the bomb victims. The design of the park and its proposed elements 
certainly lend themselves to such a description. The most recent plans for the Bali 
Peace Park released in 2013 describe it as a spiritual garden “a site for people to 
reflect and acknowledge the terrorist attack on October 12 2002” (Bali Peace Park 
Association) and incorporate a sculpture featuring 202 poles that represent the lives 
lost in the 2002 terror attack, a garden wall featuring the names of the victims and 
multi-faith contemplative corners. Like the Bali monument, the proposed park 
inscribes a certain imagery of the terrorist attacks conceptualised in terms of an attack 
on universal values of peace and harmony. Through a counter narrative of peace, the 
Bali Peace Park attempts to reconstruct the symbolic significance of the Sari Club site 
from a site that represents the terrorists’ abhorrence of Western decadence to a site 
that “turn[s] the memories of this place into a sense of respect for the deceased and of 
hope for peace in the future” (Nurhayati, 2013).In this way it challenges the official 
and popular Australian construction of the attacks as an assault on Australian values 
of freedom and democracy.  
The peace park also represents an attempt to reinscribe the Sari Club site from a 
sacred space for performative acts of private commemoration to a public 
commemoration space. Steele (2006) argues that the permeation of Western project of 
memory into non-Western locales has resulted in the evolution of memorialisation to 
an aesthetic expansion of international politics: a politicised rite and ritual for 
international society. In its barren state the Sari Club site is a site of memory only to 
those who have a personal connection with it- the survivors and families of victims 
who perform the annual rituals of memory and erect unofficial shrines. The Bali 
Peace Park research project found that an overwhelming majority of visitors to Kuta 
during the anniversary of the Bali Bombings knew nothing of the Sari Club site or its 
significance. Most assumed that the Bali monument was built on the site of the attacks 
and participated in the authorised practices of memorialisation under this assumption. 




The proposed Bali Peace Park attempts to relocate the site of memory to the Sari Club 
site and in doing so to reshape memory and produce narratives of a socio-political 
perception of the terrorist event as an attack on universal values of peace. In doing so 
it attempts to transform the Sari Club site into a locale for public performances that 
contest the imagery of terrorism. The collective acts of memorialisation on the site of 
the proposed park enact an imagery of peace through shared understandings and 
experiences of memorial- reflection, prayer and paying homage to victims. These acts 
communicate an imagining of terrorism as a threat to future peace and peacefulness in 
contrast to the political construction of terrorism as a threat to Australian values and 
the modern nation state.  
Conclusion  
The performative power of terrorism relies on the capacity of a terrorist attack to 
symbolically convey meanings to audiences that align with the meanings that the 
perpetrators wish to convey. Through violence, terrorist performers enact an imagery 
of the world that attempts to change how their audiences view the world. The 
performativity of violence is limited by the very act of violence which elicits 
responses vested in emotional experiences of anger, hatred and rage. The choice of 
attack site plays a central role in constructing the symbolic significance of a violent 
attack.  International attacks of terrorism are designed to attract widespread attention 
from multiple and diverse audiences. The way the attack is perceived, interpreted and 
constructed often relies on symbolic significance of the attack target in both the minds 
of the terrorist perpetrators and their audiences. While attack sites are generally of 
interest because of their symbolic significance to terrorists, very little attention has 
been paid within terrorism studies to the symbolic significance of attack sites after an 
attack. Attack sites become theatres of performance that invite actors to enact images 
that contest the imagery of the terrorist attack. These kinds of performances; 
unauthorised shrines and commemorations often enacted by victims, survivors and 
families, also have a performative power through the construction of counter 
narratives. Performance and performativity accommodate frameworks for appraising 
and evaluating the contribution of civic acts of counter terrorism as well as official 
counter terrorism. It does this by enabling collective activism to be seen as part of a 
broader performance where the performative act of violence creates a space for 
diverse actors to enact images that contest the symbolic significance of violence and 
challenge its performative power.  
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